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 1. Introduction 
There are two questions that we need to answer when embarking on a discussion 
of global duties to aid. Firstly, “What do we need to do to discharge our obligations to 
people in other countries?”, which is a question about what needs to be done as much as it 
is about what duties we actually have. 
The second, and more philosophically interesting, question is “Why do we have 
these obligations?”. This relates to the reasons  we have such duties and the justifications 
that exist for our global duties to aid. This is a prior question because the way in which we 
answer it will affect the way that we can answer the first question posed. Without an 
adequate definition of the reasons for our duties, we will struggle to provide a 
comprehensive description of what those duties are. 
In this paper I focus on three cosmopolitan approaches to answering this second 
question in the context of global health care justice: Pogge’s negative duties based approach 
(Pogge 2008: 15), Brock’s minimal needs view (Brock 2009: 54-5), and Henry Shue’s 
model of basic rights (Shue 1980: 18). While these approaches share a common focus on 
attempting to justify the existence of global duties to aid, held by the wealthy and owed to 
the global poor, each offers a distinct interpretation of why such duties exist and suggests 
a range of options for fulfilling them. Importantly, while I argue that Shue’s approach to 
our global duties is the most effective of the three, I consider they all offer important insight 
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into the problem of global poverty and provide a variety of possible practical solutions to 
this problem. 
I will argue that Shue’s model offers the most comprehensive justification of global 
duties and in fact can be seen as accommodating or incorporating the other two approaches. 
The efficacy of Shue's approach can be seen to have its foundation in his rejection of the 
positive/negative rights dichotomy. Shue’s rejection of this widely, and mistakenly, held 
view of rights and duties is central to his argument for global duties to aid, as I discuss 
below. However, it is first important to explain my use of health care as an example for this 
paper. In the following two sections I first consider why health care should be considered 
an important good and go on to examine why we should consider it a question of justice. 
 
 2. Why Health and Health Care 
Each of the approaches I consider in this paper is primarily concerned with 
deprivation and poverty generally, with the inequity of access to health care being 
considered as one issue amongst many. In this paper I concentrate on access to health care 
for two reasons.2 Firstly, health care can be easily recognised as a fundamental requirement 
of living even a minimally decent human life. Lacking health, or being unable to “access” 
it, through lack of access to essential health care services for example, is profoundly 
unpleasant at best and completely debilitating to the point of preventing enjoyment of even 
a basic standard of living at worst. Health care is also of importance because of its role in 
enabling many aspects of human life; for example, Nussbaum includes “bodily health” in 
her capabilities list (2003: 41-2), David Held recognises the importance of physical and 
mental health for democratic participation (1995: 192, 194-5), and Gillian Brock includes 
health in her list of requirements for human agency (2009: 66). Similarly, Henry Shue 
argues that health and health care are necessary for the enjoyment of all other rights (1980: 
23-5). 
There are those, such as Thomas Nagel, who regard the provision of basic welfare 
services, such as health care, as a charitable, humanitarian issue, rather than a question of 
justice (2005: 118). This position is based on a restricted understanding of what we should 
consider our obligations to those living in poverty to be, and suggests that while we should 
help the global poor, such action would be supererogatory, rather than simply a moral 
 
      3 
obligation. I shall to a certain extent assume that this position is incorrect. What I am 
concerned with is answering the question of why we have duties to distant others, rather 
than establishing exactly what they are. Of course, since I am concerned with three specific 
cosmopolitan justifications for our duties to aid I will implicitly argue against Nagel’s more 
restrictive view of moral obligation, though this is not the main focus of this paper. 
 
 3. An Example: The Global Burden of Tuberculosis 
To clarify why access to health care should be considered a question of justice it is 
helpful to look at the example of the global distribution of cases of tuberculosis (TB). 
Tuberculosis is a useful example for four key reasons. Firstly, it is a disease which is 
debilitating and which can kill, so we can consider the disease to have a severe adverse 
affect on personal welfare. Secondly, it is a disease that is both preventable and curable. 
Thirdly, it is a disease which is far more dangerous to people with a weakened immune 
system, so we can reduce vulnerability by addressing those conditions, such as malnutrition, 
which adversely affect general health. 
This focus on general health promotion as a means of addressing the spread of 
tuberculosis is a key part of the World Health Organisation strategy for addressing TB 
(World Health Organization 2010a: 9). The argument behind these first three points is that 
since the disease has a major adverse effect on personal welfare, and we are able to help 
those at risk of tuberculosis and those currently infected, we cannot argue that the 
alleviation of suffering caused by the disease is beyond existing medical and social 
capabilities. 
A final point about tuberculosis and justice is demonstrated by the distribution of 
cases globally. Tuberculosis predominantly affects those living in poorer parts of the world, 
with roughly two-thirds of the incidences of the disease occurring in Africa and South-East 
Asia (World Health Organization 2010b). Wealthier countries, such as the United States 
and the UK, are relatively unaffected by comparison (World Health Organization 2010b). 
This disparity is important because it suggests that there is something that rich countries 
are doing that poor countries are not, which means that they are less affected than they 
would be otherwise. In itself this may not be a compelling reason to regard access to health 
care as an issue of justice. However, when we consider Pogge’s (2008: 118-20) arguments 
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on the impact of large scale economic activity in exacerbating global poverty, the disparity 
in incidences of tuberculosis seems more likely to be a possible case of injustice. In line 
with Pogge’s thinking generally about wealth disparities, and the causal role wealthy 
countries have in exacerbating them, the disparity of tuberculosis incidence rates between 
rich and poor countries may indicate that poor countries are unable to replicate certain 
conditions that keep these rates low in wealthier countries. Therefore, by exacerbating 
poverty, wealthy countries may be encouraging, or at least allowing, the circumstances in 
which diseases like tuberculosis can thrive. In the following section I examine the first of 
the three approaches to global justice that this paper is concerned with; Thomas Pogge’s 
negative duties based approach. 
 
 4. Approach One: Pogge’s Negative Duties Approach 
Pogge’s argument is based on the claim that there is a negative duty not to cause 
harm. He accepts, at least for the purposes of his argument, the negative view of rights and 
attempts to provide a justification for global duties of aid based on the empirical claim that 
the actions of agents in wealthy nations are in fact causing harm to the poor through 
economic, social and diplomatic practices, so that these agents are failing in their duties 
not to cause harm (Pogge 2008: 148-50).3 For the purposes of this paper I shall assume that 
all of Pogge’s claims about the harmful effects of the actions of wealthy nations are correct 
and that we are actually causing harm to the global poor through our actions. Pogge offers 
a variety of examples of the ways in which the actions of the wealthy affect the global poor. 
However, it is not the empirical data which concerns me, but rather the basis of his 
philosophical position which seems to leave him vulnerable to a problematic objection. 
Pogge’s argument is almost deceptively simple; there is a duty not to harm, 
currently we (in wealthy countries) do harm people, and therefore we fail in our duty. 
Therefore, to fulfil our duty not to harm we must change our behaviours. In the case of 
tuberculosis, we could say that since our actions encourage poverty, we restrict the extent 
to which poor countries can provide their citizens with adequate social services and so 
encourage the conditions in which tuberculosis and diseases like it thrive. Therefore, we 
are failing in our duty not to cause harm by encouraging poverty and hence disease so we 
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must refrain from certain behaviours and increase our proactive involvement in activities 
which address global poverty and deprivation. 
There are three main options open to those who would criticise Pogge’s argument. 
 Firstly, there are two type of possible empirical objection, which Pogge 
acknowledges, and I believe, successfully rejects. Specifically, there are those criticisms 
that deny the causal responsibility of wealthy nations for conditions in poor countries 
(Pogge 2008: 12-15), and there are those that accept causal responsibility but deny that 
there is a better alternative available (6-11).4 
An example of the case of the first objection can be found in John Rawls’ The Law 
of Peoples, where he states that conditions in poor countries are likely to be the result of 
“oppressive governments and corrupt elites” (Rawls 1999a: 77; Pogge 2008: 295, fn238). 
This claim may be partially correct, corruption and oppression can hardly be thought to be 
to the benefit of the global poor. However, as Pogge notes, this explanation ignores the role 
that wealthy countries have in supporting those governments and elites, and the 
responsibility that obtains as a result of such support. As such, the claim is hard to 
substantiate given the range of examples offered by Pogge of the impact that the actions of 
wealthy nations can have on the global poor (2008: 118-22, 148). Similarly, Leif Wenar 
has drawn attention to the impact that our engagement through trade with authoritarian 
regimes in resource-rich countries actively harms the citizens of such countries by 
depriving their citizenry of resources which should be used for their benefit (Wenar 2008: 
3-4). 
The more subtle claim, that there is no better alternative to the existing world order, 
may be based on a variety of empirical arguments. For the purposes of this paper I shall 
briefly consider two of these possible approaches. Firstly, as Pogge notes (2008: 9-10), it 
may be objected that the cost of helping the poor achieve a higher standard of living would 
impose such hardship on the wealthy that the outcome would be worse than the current 
global situation in terms of overall welfare (Rorty 1996: 14–16). Secondly, as Pogge also 
recognises (2008: 7-9), it may be argued that by helping the poor we inadvertently 
contribute to the worsening of everyone’s long term welfare. See, for example, Garrett 
Hardin’s article “Living on a Lifeboat” (1974) in which he argues that rapid population 
growth will lead to the inevitable exhaustion of the world’s natural resources and hence a 
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far greater loss of general welfare (and life) than would be the case if we maintain our 
current position of not helping. 
The first of these claims – that by attempting to improve the lives of the global poor 
we may be forced to drastically and unjustifiably reduce our own standard of living – Pogge 
argues is simply mistaken; the cost of massively improving the lives of the global poor is 
not so vast as to damage the welfare of the wealthy. For example, Pogge states that the cost 
to wealthy countries of lifting the 950 million people around the world out of extreme 
poverty and into the “higher” economic category of “severe poverty” would cost roughly 
$38 billion annually. A large sum certainly, but the impact on wealthy countries would, 
according to Pogge, reduce “our share from 78.98 percent of the global product down to 
78.90 percent” (2008: 105), hardly an immense loss. 
 Pogge also provides a convincing argument against the “population explosion” 
argument suggested by Hardin. Hardin’s argument may initially seem convincing; drawing 
attention to the great difference between population growth rates in wealthy and poor 
countries,5 he raises concerns about the sustainability of such rapid population growth in a 
world of scarce resources. However, as Amartya Sen has argued (1994), there is an inverse 
correlation between improved economic status and population growth; that is, when 
income and welfare go up, the birth rate decreases. To argue that rapid population growth 
is a threat to everybody, and that the preventable deaths of millions are in some way 
necessary, is to ignore significant empirical data which demonstrates the exact opposite of 
what is argued: that alleviating poverty is an effective way of controlling population growth. 
Pogge counters the empirical objections to his argument, but it is a philosophical 
question that presents a more troubling problem for his position. Pogge explicitly argues 
that “human rights entail only negative duties” (2008: 72). By rejecting any positive 
interpretations of duties, Pogge ignores a significant aspect of human rights as there will 
inevitably be cases where merely refraining from harmful action will be insufficient to 
guarantee the entitlements provided by a human right. Even if we accept the argument that 
Pogge’s position demands that we not be passive bystanders to injustice, as I think we 
should, this can readily be interpreted as a positive demand for action, rather than a negative 
demand for passivity in the face of opportunities to harm. 
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Further, and perhaps more problematically for Pogge, the ease with which it is 
possible to rephrase certain “negative” duties as “positive” requirements highlights the 
inadequacy of a purely negative model of duty. Even if one acknowledges that Pogge’s 
argument demands that we must actively engage with making global institutions just, this 
seems to be an obviously positive duty and one which his approach is ill-suited to account 
for. It seems to be the case that Pogge’s account of duty does actually imply positive duties, 
but in explicitly stating his support for a “negative duties alone” model (2008: 26) Pogge 
leaves himself without the right tools to include the positive steps needed to facilitate those 
duties. 
Further, focusing purely on negative duties ignores the importance of assistance 
after harms have occurred, and cases where a person has suffered significant damage to 
their welfare through brute bad luck, rather than the actions of any identifiable agent. I shall 
call this the “sorry but...”-argument. This claim would allow opponents of duties to the 
global poor to acknowledge that harm has been done, but then to deny that they have any 
responsibility to actually do anything to help as they were not responsible for the harms 
caused. For example, such an argument could accept that we should refrain from harming, 
but deny that there is a corresponding duty to help, as such an obligation would be a positive 
duty and as such would be an unwarranted restriction on liberty.6 
This is difficult to address within Pogge’s framework precisely because he 
explicitly accepts the negative rights view, and thus gives too much space for his opponent 
to reject all non-negative duties. Therefore, even though for Pogge the duties are negative, 
they clearly contain significant positive elements which cannot be accounted for under 
Pogge’s model and which weaken the claim that human rights and justice require only 
negative duties. If one does not accept the existence of duties to the global poor, or if one 
is committed to a purely negative view of those duties, it is far too easy, on acceptance of 
Pogge’s view, to reject essential demands of human rights as being beyond the scope of 
negative duty. Thus his argument is vulnerable to an objection grounded on the same 
foundations as his own – the negative view of duties. 
As I have stated above, Pogge successfully rejects the empirical objections to his 
position. However, by embracing a “negative duties only” model, he does not seem to be 
able to account for the full range of duties demanded by human rights. Before I discuss this 
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problem in more detail I will first examine the second of the three approaches to global 
justice that I am concerned with in this paper, Brock’s minimal needs approach. 
 
 5. Approach Two: Brock’s Minimum Entitlements Approach 
Where Pogge approaches a justification of our global duties using a negative duty 
not to harm, Gillian Brock is primarily concerned with meeting basic needs. She proposes 
a minimum threshold based approach which is reminiscent of the argument presented by 
Peter Singer in “Famine, Affluence, and Morality” (1972) in that she argues that since we 
are able to lift those living in severe poverty above a minimum acceptable welfare threshold 
at little cost to ourselves, we have an obligation to do so. 
 Brock’s focus is on shared fundamental human needs, including things such as 
certain basic liberties and protection from common causes of harm (2009: 52). These basic 
needs, Brock argues, should concern us as a matter of justice because they are so 
fundamental to living an autonomous human life that those without them do not enjoy even 
a minimally acceptable welfare standard. 
While Brock's conclusion is similar to that offered by Singer, her justification for 
that conclusion is profoundly Rawlsian, based as it is on a variation on the original position 
which Brock calls the “ideal choosing situation” (2009: 52). Brock argues that in the ideal 
choosing situation, which includes a modified veil of ignorance, participants would select 
a minimum threshold model as the fairest way to guarantee an acceptable welfare standard 
for all persons. Such a solution would be just, she argues, because it represents a rational 
choice for persons to make as it offers a broader set of guarantees, compatible with all 
views of the good, than those suggested by Rawls as arising from the original position. 
Brock reinforces her argument with reference to empirical studies conducted by 
Frohlich and Oppenheimer (1992) which confirm the results of the thought experiment. In 
these studies, which were conducted internationally, participants from a variety of cultural 
backgrounds were asked to select a just system of guaranteeing individual welfare from 
four options. Importantly, the studies were conducted under similar conditions to those 
endorsed by Brock in her ideal choosing situation, with particular emphasis on “conditions 
of impartiality” (Brock 2009: 54). The four options available included: firstly, a Rawlsian 
difference principle (Rawls 1999b: 65) for maximising the income of the worst off; 
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secondly, a principle to maximise the average income, following Harsanyi (1953); thirdly, 
a principle “maximising the average with a floor constraint of $____”; and, finally, a 
principle which maximised “the average with a range constraint of $____” (Brock 2009: 
54-5). Overwhelmingly, a safety net or minimum threshold model (the third option) was 
selected as the most just or fairest way of guaranteeing individual welfare (Brock 2009: 
55). 
As with Pogge, I think Brock’s argument has considerable force and covers much 
ground that Pogge does not. However, I do have a concern with one consequence of Brock’s 
focus on individual needs and a minimum acceptable welfare standard: it is difficult 
following Brock to assign responsibility to specific persons, an advantage that Pogge, and 
Shue, have over Brock. This is perhaps not terribly problematic as we can readily assign 
responsibility through reference to our shared needs or a reciprocity agreement. “Why me?” 
can be answered “because you would get the same help if you were in their place”. And, 
of course, institutions play a key role in actual distributions, so their role in facilitating 
existing deprivations as well as potential solutions should not be overlooked as a basis for 
justifying their obligations to help. However, reciprocity and empathy are not the best 
justifications for duties to aid available to us. For reciprocity we must answer concerns 
about duties to those who cannot reciprocate, and empathic  arguments depend on 
acknowledging that we would have a duty to help in the first place, something that many 
governments and individuals are of course notoriously unwilling to consider.   
 
 6. Defining the Problem 
As mentioned above, Pogge’s acceptance of the negative view of duties presents 
significant difficulty when attempting to justify certain kinds of positive action, such as 
providing aid to the deprived. In contrast, as I discuss below, Shue rejects the classification 
of rights and duties as being either positive or negative and can therefore justify a wider 
range of moral obligations than is available to Pogge. Brock’s focus on individual needs, 
derived from a variation of the original position avoids the problem of justifying positive 
action by emphasising the importance of certain social goods.  However, Brock's 
position presupposes that others will share her recognition of the need to guarantee these 
goods, and it is by no means clear that such recognition is widespread. Therefore, it is 
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difficult for Brock to make demands of specific agents as she does not provide a 
comprehensive justification of who should do what. By comparison, Shue can justify a 
much closer link between specific agents and positive behaviours, because he adopts a 
rights based approach, thereby implying the assignation of duties, but he rejects the 
negative/positive distinction which creates such problems for Pogge. In the rest of the paper, 
I argue that Shue’s approach provides the kind of comprehensive argument necessary for a 
full justification of global duties to aid. 
 
 7. Approach Three: Shue and Basic Rights, Rejecting the Positive/Negative 
Rights Distinction 
As mentioned in the previous section, there are a variety of problems associated 
with the justifications of our global duties offered by Pogge and by Brock. Each has its 
own difficulties, but they share a common issue in that both models assume the validity of 
the distinction between positive and negative rights and duties. This distinction is based on 
the claim that there is a significant difference between positive rights, which entitle rights 
holders to demand that others perform certain actions, and negative rights, which entitle 
the holder to demand that duty bearers refrain from certain behaviours. 
Contrary to this, Henry Shue claims that there is no basic right which can be 
classified as either positive or negative. As such, arguments which rest on the assumption 
that the positive/negative distinction is correct will present an incomplete picture of the 
kinds of duties that are required for global justice. 
Shue describes three categories of basic rights: to security, to subsistence and to 
liberty. Each of these basic rights is made up of various constitutive elements. Thus, the 
right to security includes rights to protection from harm and against theft of one’s property; 
the right to subsistence contains rights to things like adequate nutrition, sanitation and basic 
health care; and the right to liberty contains rights to personal freedoms, such as self 
determination and political participation. Shue considers these rights to be fundamental 
prerequisites for the enjoyment of any other rights; they are basic because without them, 
according to Shue, we cannot have any rights at all. In this way he shares similarities with 
both Pogge and Brock. Like Pogge he derives his argument about duty from a logical 
extension of what it means to have a right, but like Brock his concern is for establishing a 
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minimum threshold of entitlement. These rights are basic according to Shue not only 
because they enable the enjoyment of other rights, but also because they guarantee the 
ability to have a “decent life” (1980: ix). 
It is important to note that as well as being necessary for non-basic rights, each of 
the three basic rights is dependent on each of the others: the enjoyment of security depends 
on our enjoyment of liberty and subsistence rights, etc. For example, we cannot enjoy a 
right to liberty if we are starving to death, no more than we can if we must risk being 
assaulted in order to vote. Similarly, a right to security or to subsistence is worth little if 
we are at the mercy of some temporarily “benevolent dictator” (Idem: 74-5) as Shue puts 
it. Each of the basic rights cannot therefore be classified as either positive or negative, their 
interdependence demands both that we are guaranteed protection from and assistance in 
the case of certain harms, just as they also entitle us to demand that others not perpetrate 
certain acts against us; positive and negative demands respectively. “It is impossible” Shue 
argues “for any basic right – however ‘negative’ it has come to seem – to be fully 
guaranteed unless all three types of duties are fulfilled” (53). 
For example, the right to political participation, itself one aspect of the right to 
liberty, entails both negative and positive requirements. The entitlement to vote, or to 
engage in political protest, obviously requires that rights holders not be subject to violence 
or intimidation when attempting to cast their ballot, so there is a negative duty not to 
attempt to limit a person’s entitlement to participation through such means. But the right 
also requires that laws and the means to enforce them exist so that rights holders are 
protected from “those who do not choose not to violate [the right to political participation]” 
(39). The right to political participation therefore requires both negative and positive duties. 
It is simply not enough that we not perform certain actions; we also have to ensure that 
those who would choose to restrict the rights of others are unable to do so (61). Fulfilment 
of the “positive” condition of the right to liberty can be constructed as a duty to contribute 
fairly to taxation so that the means of law enforcement are funded in such a way as to be 
able to enforce the duties relating to a specific right. Of course, the creation and 
maintenance of a system of laws also demands the existence of a duty to contribute fairly 
through taxation. 
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This rejection of the positive/negative rights distinction is central to Shue’s 
argument, and is the theoretical foundation which allows him to offer a more 
comprehensive position than either Pogge or Brock. By arguing that rights require both 
positive and negative duties Shue can avoid Pogge’s difficulty with justifying positive 
action and assign responsibility to specific agents more effectively than Brock. 
To account for the broad requirements of the interrelated basic rights Shue offers 
the following “tripartite” (53) model of duty, which includes both positive and negative 
requirements. 
 
“I. To avoid depriving. 
 II. To protect from deprivation 
1. By enforcing duty (I) and 
2. By designing institutions that avoid the creation of strong incentives to 
violate duty (I). 
III. To aid the deprived 
1. Who are one’s special responsibility, 
2. Who are the victims of social failures in the performance of duties (I), 
(II-1), (II-2) and 
3. Who are the victims of natural disasters.”  
(Shue 1980: 60) 
 
Like Pogge, Shue includes a proscription against harming (or depriving) under duty 
one, and like Brock, he recognises the importance of basic needs by demanding a duty to 
aid under duty three. Importantly, duty two offers an intermediate step between the other 
two and serves to support the duty not to cause harm. This duty recognises the existence of 
harms that we can prevent or at least minimise the risk of their occurring and to enforce 
the duty to avoid depriving. Importantly, according to Shue, each of the duties can be held 
by both individuals and institutions, though the requirements may vary according to the 
agents (60-1). 
 
 8. The Implications of Shue’s Model for Health Care 
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If we relate this model to health care we can see that Duty One would require us to 
avoid behaviours likely to cause harm, drunk driving for example. Looking beyond 
individuals, the way that the TRIPS regime within the pharmaceutical industry excludes 
the poor from essential medicines is an example of corporate or governmental failure to 
meet the duty to avoid depriving.7 
The TRIPS regime is problematic for the latter two of Shue’s three duties, but it 
also violates the duty to avoid depriving. Prior to the advent of the TRIPS regime, 
manufacturers of generic medicines in countries such as India could work under domestic 
patent laws which allowed the production of generic drugs by providing patents only on 
processes rather than products. This allowed manufacturers to develop generic versions of 
drugs for sale to those who would be unable to afford the monopoly prices demanded for 
branded medicines (Barton 2004: 147). In contrast, TRIPS provides patents for products 
rather than processes, meaning that generic manufacturers are now unable to offer generic 
versions of drugs which are still under patent.8 The effect of this change is that the TRIPS 
regime has deprived the global poor of their main source of essential medicines by 
rendering the process by which affordable medicines are created illegal (Barton 2004: 149-
52). 
The second duty requires that both individuals and institutions contribute fairly to 
the maintenance of health promoting or protecting institutions, for example a duty to pay 
our fair share of the tax burden to ensure that adequate sanitation is provided to all people. 
Similarly, the duty to protect also implies the existence of meaningful laws which enforce 
the duty to avoid depriving and reduce the likelihood of risks to health occurring in the first 
place. 
Shue acknowledges that in a world of perfect beneficence, where everyone fulfilled 
their duty to avoid depriving, there may be less need for a duty to protect (1980: 61). 
However, he rejects this possibility as unrealistically utopian and argues that while people 
and corporations may restrain themselves under threat of the law, they are far less likely to 
do so when not so restricted. Accordingly, Shue argues that a duty to protect is necessary 
to ensure good behaviour by those who may cause harm (61). In the case of the right to 
health care, as with other rights, while perfect beneficence and adherence to duty might be 
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theoretically possible, it is extremely unlikely, so the relevant laws and regulations are 
necessary as a matter of practicality. 
The duty to aid most closely corresponds to Brock’s argument. It is a duty to ensure 
that in cases where we were unable to prevent harm those affected are not ignored or left 
to die. In the case of health care this duty would require the provision of treatment for 
disease or injury. Similarly, the duty would require the provision of support in terms of 
sanitation, sewerage, and nutrition to those affected by natural disasters. 
Like the three basic rights, Shue’s three duties are interconnected, so a right which 
did not entail the fulfilment of all three types of duty would lack significant force. In the 
absence of the duty not to harm, the duty to protect could soon be overwhelmed by the 
needs of those harmed by the actions of the malevolent or negligent. Similarly, in the 
absence of the duty to protect, the right not to be harmed would become dependent on luck, 
while the duty to aid would face far greater demands, prevention being better, and usually 
cheaper, than cure. Finally, refusing a duty to aid overlooks the fact that duties are often 
ignored and that poor luck can have consequences as bad, if not worse, than malicious 
action. As such, ignoring an obligation to provide aid would turn the duties to avoid 
depriving and to protect into the worst kind of threshold, one which merely described a line 
beneath which the unfortunate were condemned to struggle. 
 
 9. Resolving the Problem 
I mentioned above that the main concern I have with Pogge’s justification of global 
duties to aid arises because of his acceptance of the negative view of rights and duties. This 
view holds that moral duties can only demand that we refrain from engaging in certain 
types of behaviours,9 and, as such, Pogge's acceptance of the view makes it difficult for 
him to move from responsibility for harms to any demands for positive action. In contrast, 
Brock’s focus on individual needs provides a sound justification of why certain goods, such 
as health care, are important, because they enable human agency (2009: 66). However, her 
model does not provide as convincing an argument as to why specific agents have a 
responsibility to guarantee access to those goods as that provided by Shue. Shue’s approach 
offers a stronger argument for assigning duties as well as a way to avoid the problems of 
positive duties associated with Pogge’s position. 
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Shue recognises the importance of a duty to avoid harming, but he makes no claim 
that this is based on a negative model of rights; it is simply a requirement of having a right 
that others not violate it. So he can account for Pogge’s approach here. Similarly, Brock’s 
approach can be accounted for by Shue’s acknowledgement of the significance of positive 
action. We have to have some duty to protect and to aid, else the duty not to harm really 
does become as Shue puts it “the only poison they [the vulnerable] need” (1980: 19). The 
interrelatedness of Shue’s three basic rights is fundamental to his argument and provides 
the basis for his rejection of the positive/negative rights distinction, itself an integral part 
of Shue's argument. By emphasising the relationship between the three basic rights, and 
arguing for the necessity of both “positive” and “negative” duties in his tripartite account 
of duty, Shue can place a wider range of obligations on duty bearers by drawing attention 
to the need for active, “positive” engagement in the fulfilment of rights, such as the right 
to liberty, which are frequently, and mistakenly, thought of as purely negative rights. 
Furthermore, he can also make claims about responsibility in a stronger manner 
than Brock, because he grounds his argument in an analysis of rights and argues that we 
have to have rights to certain things if we are to have any rights at all. By doing so he can 
point at a right to life (or the kind of goods that he and Brock are both concerned with) and 
demand “do you think that we have this?”.10  If the answer is yes, then we are committed 
at least to his framework of basic rights. If the answer is no, then it seems that the 
respondent is suggesting some kind of Hobbesian state of nature where no rights were 
guaranteed, which seems, at least intuitively, inherently unsatisfying. 
 
 10. Conclusion 
My aim in this paper has been modest. I do not wish to assert that either Pogge’s or 
Brock’s argument is untenable or should be ignored. Much can be learned from both 
positions and both offer a significant contribution to a comprehensive approach to global 
justice. Pogge’s “Global Resource Dividend” (Pogge 2008: 202), and his involvement in 
the development of the “Health Impact Fund” (Hollis and Pogge 2008; Bannerjee et al. 
2010), as well as Brock’s “Global Justice Fund” (Brock 2009: 136), offer excellent 
practical suggestions for addressing global poverty. However, neither Pogge nor Brock can 
offer a fully satisfying argument for the existence of our global duties to aid. Pogge’s 
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account gives too much to the neo-liberal position by tacitly accepting that we should only 
view negative duties as having any weight, and by doing so he allows room for a critic to 
argue that because we only have negative duties we are only under obligation to stop 
harming, something which can be interpreted minimally, and not to actually help. In 
contrast, Brock’s position can offer an argument as to why someone should help, but a 
much weaker explanation of why any specific agent should help than can be provided under 
Shue’s model. 
Shue meanwhile does give us a reason to care about a minimum threshold, and 
provides explanation of why specific agents should consider themselves responsible. For 
Shue, the varied responsibilities under his tripartite account of duty can be assigned to 
everyone, because that responsibility is simply a requirement of the existence of rights. 
Exactly what those responsibilities are will vary according to the agent specific context, 
which may include factors such as ability, culpability and relationship to the specific right 
holder. However, while the specifics of how rights are to be fulfilled may vary, we can 
readily assign general duties to specific agents in a far simpler manner than is available to 
Brock. Where Brock must move from a need based model to duty, Shue works within the 
model of rights and duties and challenges mistaken preconceptions about them. Thus, Shue 
has a much simpler path to the assignation of specific duties. 
Neither Pogge nor Brock offers a full justification of our duties to aid. They offer 
partial solutions, and each of them is vulnerable to the questions I have set out. In contrast, 
if we follow Shue’s approach, we are provided with a comprehensive argument which 
avoids the objections simply by rejecting the classification of rights and duties as positive 
or negative. And this is the key strength of Shue’s argument – by rejecting the false 
dichotomy of positive/negative rights he removes a significant argument against duties to 
aid, that we have only negative duties. By classifying rights as having a broader set of 
requirements than what would be allowed under a purely negative model, Shue demands 
that if we acknowledge a right to anything, we must fulfil certain positive and negative 
obligations. We cannot deny a duty simply because it is positive and hence too demanding, 
because to do so turns rights and duties into meaningless decoration used to disguise the 
fact that such “quasi-rights” offer no more protection than being lucky enough to avoid 
disease or violence. 
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Rejecting the positive/negative distinction enables us to justify a better system of 
rights and duties relating to health care or to other issues of justice than is available if we 
follow either Pogge or Brock’s approach. If the foundation of Shue’s argument is that if we 
have a right to something we must also have a right to the things necessary for it, the 
framework of the argument is that to classify a right as either positive or negative is simply 
to misunderstand what a right is. In the case of health care, declaring that we have a right 
only to non-interference means only that we are free to die of the first disease that is severe 
enough. If we only have a right to protection, then we only have a right to health care until 
that protection fails, if we catch some unpreventable disease, or are in a car accident we 
are on our own. Finally, if we have only a right to assistance, then we are entitled to help, 
but that help can at best restore us to health and not compensate us for being harmed in the 
first place. And, in any case, even if we are returned to full health, we have still been 
harmed, and a reason to think health is important is because lacking it can be catastrophic. 
Any actual basic right must entail a comprehensive set of corresponding duties beyond 
mere non-interference if it is going to be worth anything, and Shue’s approach offers the 
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2 It may be objected that since health is the objective of health care, we should talk in terms of access to 
health rather than health care. This is a profoundly complicated question and I do not wish to go into it here, 
instead I shall use the term “health care” in a very loose sense, and leave discussion of whether we have a 
right to health or health care for another time. 
3 I take “agents” to include individual persons, corporations, as well as governments. 
4 Pogge refers to these arguments as “easy reasons to ignore world poverty” (Pogge 2008: 6) 
5 At the time Hardin’s article was published population growth in wealthy countries was at a rate that would 
double the population every 87 years, while the same effect in poor countries took only 35 years (Hardin 
1974: 564). 
6 I discuss this issue in greater detail in sections seven and eight below. 
7 The Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) regime is an agreement between member 
states of the World Trade Organization which provides guaranteed monopolies to the creators of certain kinds 
of intellectual property, including; trademarks, industrial designs and patents (World Trade Organization 
1994: 319). Importantly, the TRIPS agreement also provides protection for pharmaceutical products, thus 
granting patent holders a monopoly on the production and sale of potentially life saving drugs. TRIPS has 
been widely criticised, both for its alleged ineffectiveness (Hubbard & Love 2004), and for the way that it 
allows pharmaceutical companies to charge extremely high prices for medicines which may make them 
inaccessible to those with insufficient funds (Barton 2004: 149–50; Hollis & Pogge 2008: p.1). 
8 Of course, it may be objected that what is relevant in this case is that the original producer of drugs loses 
out on a potential market for their products if other companies can manufacture generic versions of their 
                                                 
 
      20 
                                                                                                                                                 
products and undercut them on price. However, we should remember that the people who are most in need 
of cheap drugs and who have been most harmed by the limitations placed on their production are the same 
people who would simply not have been able to purchase brand-name drugs in the first place. Given the 
inability of the global poor to pay monopoly prices for brand name drugs, a market which caters to their 
unmet needs, such as the Indian generic pharmaceuticals industry, does not remove a potential or former 
market for pharmaceutical companies; rather it provides the benefits of medical technology to those who 
would otherwise not have been able to benefit from it. Hollis and Pogge discuss this in more detail in The 
Health Impact Fund: Making New Medicines Available for All (2008: 64-66). 
 
9 As opposed to legal duties which may involve positive obligations. 
10 Shue and Brock share a sufficientarian concern with establishing a minimum threshold of entitlement to 
certain basic goods. However, where Brock writes in terms of goods, Shue is focused on rights and duties, 
another reason it is easier, using his approach, to assign responsibility to specific persons. 
